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Defending the Mentally III 
Maryland: The Guilty Plea 
The Insanity Defense 
• In 
vs. 
by Paul Handy 
T he decision to enter a plea in a criminal proceeding is fraught with constitutional, ethical and 
strategical dilemmas. Consider the fol~ 
lowing situation: counsel has been re~ 
tained by a client accused of committing 
a serious crime. Preliminary discovery 
and investigation indicate that the State 
has a strong case for conviction. How~ 
ever, one or more psychiatrists who 
have evaluated the client conclude that 
he was mentally impaired at the time of 
the alleged criminal act. The defendant 
is found competent to stand trial. How 
should he be advised to plead? 
Before advising the client on the plea, 
defense counsel should consider some 
recent developments in Maryland law. 
There is no longer an appeal as of right 
from a guilty plea. I The defendant now 
carries the burden of persuading by a 
preponderance of the evidence on the 
insanity issue.2 A successful insanity de~ 
fense carries the collateral consequence 
of a criminal conviction as well as an ad~ 
judication of "not criminally respon~ 
sible."3 An individual found both guilty 
and insane may be confined for a period 
longer than the maximum sentence for 
the offense committed.4 
Even if the defendant has a meritor~ 
ious insanity defense, there are numer~ 
ous reasons to forego its use. These rea~ 
sons include: (1) a jury is unlikely to re~ 
turn an insanity verdict where the act 
was egregious; (2) the defendant might 
prefer a definite prison term to indefinite 
confinement in a mental institution; (3) 
the defendant might wish to avoid the 
double consequences of the "guilty" 
and "insane" verdicts; and (4) if it is a 
political crime, an insanity defense 
would diminish its impact.s 
Nevertheless, the insanity defense 
does have certain advantages for the de~ 
fendant. A guilty verdict alone is insuf~ 
ficient to determine sentencing where 
the defendant requires psychiatric as~ 
sistance. Also, in a capital case, the in~ 
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sanity defense excuses the defendant 
from criminal responsibility, thus re~ 
moving the peril of the death penalty. 
This article will explore some of the 
factors to be considered in choosing 
either to plead guilty or to raise an in~ 
sanity defense. The issues of civil com~ 
mitment,6 competency to stand tria1,7 
and plea bargaining will not be discussed 
except where relevant. Defense counsel 
should attempt to convince the State's 
Attorney to enter a stet or nolle prose~ 
qui and refer the defendant for civil 
commitment. This article will focus on 
the procedural requirements, ethical 
considerations, and consequences of the 
guilty plea and of the insanity defense. 
The Guilty Plea 
In Maryland, the defendant may plead 
not guilty, guilty, or, with the court's 
permission, nolo contendere.8 In addi~ 
tion, under the new statute, the defen~ 
dant may interpose the defense of in~ 
sanity,9 which is titled "not criminally 
responsible." 10 
The plea of guilty involves the waiver 
of the defendant's constitutional rights 
to a trial by jury, confrontation of wit~ 
nesses, and the privilege against self~in~ 
crimination. ll Unlike the plea of nolo 
contendere,12 the guilty plea is an admis~ 
sion of actual guilt,13 and the admission 
of guilt has significance for collateral 
proceedings. For example, under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, the guilty 
plea operates as a rebuttable presump~ 
tion as to common factual issues. 14 
The United States Supreme Court has 
upheld the validity of an "Alford plea" 
in which the defendant pleads guilty but 
asserts his actual innocence. IS In North 
Carolina v. Alford,16 the defendant pled 
guilty to second~degree murder rather 
than face a possible death sentence for 
first~degree murder. The Supreme Court 
held that such a plea may be accepted, so 
long as it is made voluntarily and know~ 
ingly, and a factual basis for the charge is 
established for the record. 17 
Due to the constitutional implications 
involved, the trial court has broad dis~ 
cretion to reject a guilty plea,18 but 
limited discretion to accept such a plea. 19 
In Maryland, the court must first deter~ 
mine that the plea is being made 
''[ v ]oluntarily, with the understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the con~ 
sequences of the plea. "20 The court must 
question the defendant on the record,Zl 
but the court is not required to obtain an 
express waiver of the three above~men~ 
tioned constitutional rights.22 (Other 
jurisdictions have adopted a broader in~ 
terpretation of the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution and 
require express waiver of these rights on 
the record.23 ) 
The American Bar Association Pro~ 
ject on Minimal Standards for Criminal 
Justice takes the position that the deci~ 
sion to enter a plea belongs to the defen~ 
dant, not to defense counsel. 24 The ABA 
Project also recommends that decisions 
involving constitutional rights be made 
by the accused as these decisions are "so 
crucial to the accused's fate."2s On the 
other hand, it is also recommended that 
decisions involving trial strategy be 
made by defense counsel, who is ex~ 
pected to have experience and familiarity 
with basic legal principles.26 Under this 
standard, the guilty plea is the personal 
choice of the defendantP The defendant, 
however, is entitled to effective repre~ 
sentation of counsel in the course of 
pleading guilty. The parameters of such 
representation have only recently been 
addressed by the Supreme Court. 28 
Despite the personal character of the 
guilty plea, the defendant may not with~ 
draw a properly entered plea without the 
court's approval. Maryland Rule 4~242 
(f) provides that the court may allow the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea "where jus~ 
tice requires."29 In Maryland, the trial 
court's decision to permit withdrawal 
will not be disturbed unless the record 
shows that the State or the court acted to 
prejudice the defendant, or that consti~ 
tutional guidelines were not followed.3o 
The court may permit withdrawal at any 
time before sentence has been imposed.31 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re~ 
cently held that in a capital case where 
the defendant obtains reversal of a death 
sentence, he then may withdraw his 
guilty plea at the court's discretion be~ 
fore the subsequent sentencing 
proceeding.32 
If the trial court does not permit with~ 
drawal of the guilty plea, the defendant 
must now obtain leave of court to appeal 
the validity of a guilty plea.33 The defen~ 
dant must set out, in his motion, the 
specific grounds for the appeal, and 
must file the motion within thirty days.3<4 
Finally, the defendant's competency 
to plead guilty becomes an issue where 
there is evidence that the defendant has 
suffered from mental illness. Maryland's 
competency statute requires that the 
defendant have the capacity both to un~ 
derstand the nature of the proceedings 
and to assist in his own defense.35 There 
are different standards for competency 
to waive constitutional rights than for 
competency to stand trial.36 In Massey v. 
Moore,37 the Supreme Court per Justice 
Douglas held: "One may not be insane 
in the sense of being incapable of stand~ 
ing trial and yet lack the capacity to 
stand trial without the benefit of 
counsel. "38 
Recently, in Mann v. State's Attorney 
for Montgomery County,39 the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that a defendant 
found incompetent to stand trial cannot 
be competent to waive his privilege 
against self~incrimination.40 In dicta, the 
court observed that even a finding of 
competency to stand trial "does not 
automatically result in a conclusion that 
an accused is also competent to waive 
substantial rights, such as the right to 
plead not guilty, the right to a jury trial, 
and the right to assistance of counsel."41 
In some circumstances, 
the decision to plead 
guilt)' merely 
demonstrates that the 
defendant is 
incompetent to assist 
in his own defense. 
Thus, detense counsel should be wary 
of assenting to the defendant's election 
to plead guilty if there is evidence that he 
is mentally ill. The decision may be de~ 
fective under the voluntary and knowing 
standard. In some circumstances, the 
decision to plead guilty merely demon~ 
strates that the defendant is incompetent 
to assist in his own defense. • 
The Insanity Plea 
Maryland has adopted substantially 
the Model ~Penal Code standard for the 
insanity defense.42 Under this standard 
the defendant is not criminally respon~ 
sible for his conduct if "a~ the time of 
that conduct, the defendant, because of 
a mental disorder or mental retardation, 
lacks substantial capacity: (1) to appre~ 
ciate the criminality of that conduct; or 
(2) to conform that conduct to the re~ 
quirements of law."43 However, "a 
'mental disorder' does not include an 
abnormality that is manifested only by 
repeated criminal or otherwise anti~ 
social conduct."44 
Under the new statute, effective July 
1, 1984, the burden to establish insanity 
is placed on the defendant by a pre~ 
ponderance of the evidence.45 Although 
Mullaney v. Wilbur46 requires that the 
State carry the burden of establishing 
the elements of the offense, the Mary~ 
land appellate courts have held that the 
insanity plea is no more than an affirma~ 
tive defense47 and that it does not defeat 
the element of mens rea. 48 If it is merely a 
defense, the burden may constitution~ 
ally be placed on the defendant.49 
Maryland does not actually have a 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The issue of insanity is interposed as an 
"affirmative defense,"50 in addition to 
the "pleas" of not guilty, guilty and nolo 
contendere. 51 The insanity defense may 
be asserted by either defense counsel or 
the defendant. 52 Once the issue is 
generated, the trier of fact issues two 
verdicts: a general verdict on the issue of 
guilt, and a special verdict on the issue of 
insanity. 53 The defendant, however, is 
not entitled to a bifurcated trial on the 
issues.54 
In Langworthy v. State, 55 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland addressed three 
possible dispositions of an insanity de~ 
fense: (1) if the verdict on the general 
issue plea is not guilty, the plea of in~ 
sanity becomes moot; (2) if the general 
verdict is guilty and the special verdict is 
sane, the judge may impose sentence; 
and (3) if the general verdict is guilty and 
the special verdict is insane, the defen~ 
dant's conduct is criminally excused, 
but he has failed on the general plea.56 
Thus, if the defendant is found guilty 
but insane, he may appeal the guilty 
verdict. 57 
The question whether a judge may 
impose an insanity defense on a defen~ 
dant is not well settled in Maryland or in 
other jurisdictions. 58 The District of 
Columbia Circuit has ruled that the trial 
judge may raise sua sponte an insanity 
defense, even where the defendant and 
his attorney have decided not to pursue 
it.59 The problem with this rule is that 
there is great potential for prejudice to 
defense trial strategy and to the decision 
on the plea.60 In Lynch v. Overholser,61 a 
case arising under the D.C. insanity sta~ 
tute,62 the United States Supreme Court 
interpreted the statute as not providing 
for criminal commitment of a defendant 
on an insanity plea involuntarily raised.63 
The Court indicated that under any 
other interpretation, the statute would 
violate the Due Process Clause.64 As a 
result of Lynch, there appears to be little 
purpose in imposing an insanity defense 
on a defendant, except perhaps to steer a 
dangerous individual into the civil com~ 
mitment system for a new hearing. 
The Maryland Court of Special Ap~ 
peals apparently would allow defense 
counsel to impose this defense on his 
client. In List v. State,65 the Court ruled 
expressly that defense counsel may pur~ 
sue an insanity defense over the defen~ 
dant's refusal to consent and express ob~ 
jections.66 The insanity issue is an affir~ 
mative defense and a matter of trial 
strategy, the province of the defense at~ 
torney.67 The Court of Appeals in List, 
however, dismissed the appeal and va~ 
cated the lower appellate court's opinion.68 
The Court of Special Appeals has also 
held that defense counsel may exercise 
independent discretion to withdraw an 
insanity defense,69 and that the trial 
court may allow withdrawal without in~ 
quiring as to the defendant's waiver of 
constitutional rights since none are im~ 
plica ted. 70 The same standard for the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea under Mary~ 
land Rule 4~242(f)71 applies to the with~ 
drawal of an insanity plea,72 and broad 
An individual found 
both guilty and insane 
may be confined for a 
period longer than the 
maximum sentence for 
the offense committed. 
discretion to accept or reject the with~ 
drawal of an insanity plea vests in the 
trial judge.73 The trial judge may not, 
however, strike an insanity defense on a 
motion by the State.74 
Assuming the defendant prevails on 
the insanity defense, it may be a pyrrhic 
victory. At this point, it become neces~ 
sary to distinguish between civil and 
criminal commitment. 
Involuntary civil commitment occurs 
where the individual is confined in a 
mental health institution as a result of 
the signed certificates of two physi~ 
cians,75 or an emergency petition by the 
court, peace officers, health officers or 
other interested persons.76 Addington v. 
Texas77 requires that the committed per~ 
son be granted a hearing at which the 
State carries the burden by clear and 
convincing evidence that he poses a dan~ 
ger to himself or others.78 
Criminal commitment occurs where 
the individual is confined after a criminal 
adjudication of insanity. 79 Jones v. United 
States80 permits the burden of proving 
dangerousness to be placed on the de~ 
fendant by a preponderance of the evi~ 
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dence, since the verdicts of "guilty" and 
"insane" are probative of his potential 
harm to others.8! 
Under the new Maryland statute, ef, 
fective July 1, 1984, a defendant who is 
found "not criminally responsible" is 
automatically committed to a mental 
health institution82 and granted a release 
hearing within fifty days.83 He is then 
entitled to a hearing within one year and 
then one each year thereafter, 84 although 
he may be confined indefinitely.8S At 
each hearing, the committed person car' 
ries the burden of proving by a prepon, 
derance of the evidence that he is no 
longer dangerous.86 lt is constitutionally 
permissible for a defendant to be com-
mitted for a period longer than the maxi, 
mum sentence for the substantive 
offense.87 Thus, in terms oflength ofin, 
carceration, an insanity verdict may 
have more oppressive consequences 
than a guilty verdict for many offenses. 
Ethical Problems 
As has been shown, the decision to 
plead guilty belongs to the defendant 
alone,BB but an insanity defense ap, 
parently is a tactical decision for the at' 
torney.89 Since the gUilty plea and the 
insanity defense are usually alternative 
decisions, the distinction in decision-
making authority can result in conflicts 
between the defendant and his attor, 
ney.9O Serious ethical problems can arise. 
For example, the defendant who is men-
tally impaired may decide to plead guilty 
over counsel's objections. There may be 
a conflict between the attorney's duty to 
represent his client zealously9! and his 
duty not to disclose his client's confi, 
dences and secrets, where the attorney 
attacks his client's competency to plead 
guilty. 
These are but a few of the problems 
arising from the decision of how to 
plead. The ethical dilemmas involved in 
representing the mentally ill are too 
complex to handle here with specificity,93 
but there are some guidelines to consider. 
The Code of Professional Responsi, 
bility requires that the attorney investi, 
gate all defenses available to the client.94 
There is no duty to advance possible de' 
fenses if, in the attorney's professional 
judgment, the defendant's rights are bet, 
ter served by other means.9S The insanity 
defense, however, is more like a plea 
than any other defense and has impor-
tant consequences for the defendant. 
Therefore, notwithstanding List v. State,96 
defense counsel should be reluctant to 
decide on pursuing an insanity defense 
without the consent of the client. 
The Supreme Court recently ruled on 
22-The Law Forum/Fall, 1984 
issues of effective assistance of defense 
counsel at trial in two cases; United States 
v. Cronic97 and Strickland v. Washington. 98 
In Strickland,99 the Court per Justice 
O'Connor established certain basic 
duties of counsel: 
Counsel's function is to assist the 
defendant, and hence counsel 
owes the client a duty of loyalty, a 
duty to avoid conflicts of interest .... 
From counsel's function as assis, 
tant to the defendant derive the 
over arching duty to advocate the 
defendant's cause and the more 
particular duties to consult with 
the defendant on important deci, 
sions and to keep the defendant 
informed of impdrtant develop, 
ments in the course of prosecu-
tion. Counsel also has a duty to 
bear such skill and knowledge as 
will render the tria:l a reliable 
adversarial testing process. (cita, 
tions omitted).lOo 
The Court indicated that prevailing 
standards, such as the ABA Project on 
Minimal Standards for Criminal Jus, 
tice,lO! are only guides to determine rea, 
sonable attorney practices. 102 
Although it is the accused who must 
decide whether to plead guilty, 103 as a 
practical matter the accused will proha, 
bly rely on the attorney's advice con, 
cerning the consequences of the plea and 
the likelihood of acquittal at trial. Such 
advice is often speculative, and the 
Supreme Court has granted broad lati, 
tude to defense counsel in advising the 
client on the decision to plea.!04 Ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel has been found 
where the attorney told the client he 
could receive the death penalty but the 
death penalty had been declared uncon-
stitutional.!OS The defendant must prove 
that counsel's performance was defi-
cient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.106 
While a successful insanity defense 
will excuse the client's criminal con, 
duct lO7 and cause him to receive psychia, 
tric care,108 it may' result in a longer 
period of confinement than a guilty plea 
would.109 A guilty plea may be advan, 
tageous in terms of length of incarcera, 
tion, but a guilty plea does not by itself 
result in the defendant receiving treat, 
ment for his mental illness. Ultimately, 
the choice of plea or defense will rest on 
such factors as the client's age, the 
criminal charge, the nature of his illness, 
extent of cooperation by the State and 
the court, the psychiatric facilities avail-
able, the client's family situation, and 
various other factors. 
The defense attorney should not as' 
sume that the defendant is capable of 
pleading guilty or making informed de-
cisions on strategy merely because he 
has been found competent to stand trial. 
Defense counsel's assent to a guilty plea 
or insanity defense is critical where the 
defendant is suffering from mental dis, 
ease or disorder. In special circumstances, 
the defense attorney may be forced to at' 
tack the competency of his own client. 
In any event, an active role by counsel is 
required to assist the mentally ill defen-
dant in reaching a decision on the plea. 
Conclusion 
The decision to plead guilty or inter' 
pose an insanity defense is a difficult one, 
especially in light of the new Maryland 
insanity statute. l1O As of July 1, 1984, 
the burdens for the defense of "not 
criminally responsible" and subsequent 
release from criminal commitment have 
shifted to the defendant by a prepon, 
derance of the evidence. 111 The indivi, 
dual who has been adjudicated insane in 
a criminal proceeding may be incar, 
cerated for a period longer than the 
maximum sentence for the charged of, 
fense. ll2 The criminal defendant may be 
adjudicated both "guilty" and "insane" 
and suffer the collateral consequences of 
both verdicts. 113 
In appropriate circumstances, defense 
counsel may consider advising the client 
to plead guilty as an alternative to raising 
an insanity issue at trial. A guilty verdict 
results in a definite period of confine, 
ment while criminal commitment can 
last indefinitely,114 On the other hand, 
an insanity defense is advisable where 
the defendant is in present need of psy, 
chiatric care, or where he faces a possible 
death sentence. 
Because this decision is so crucial to 
the defendant's personal liberty and in' 
volves basic constitutional rights, the 
decision should be made by the defen, 
dant after consultation with defense 
counsel concerning the alternatives 
available and their consequences. De-
fense counsel must take an active role in 
the decision,making process, particu, 
larly where the defendant is still suffer-
ing from mental illness. m 
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